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There is a basic tension inherent in the regulation of corporations between the role to be 
played by boards and that to be played by shareholders. Boards have the statutory responsibility 
to manage the business and affairs of the corporation, and owe an express duty to act in the 
best interests of the corporation. Shareholders, however, are the ultimate ‘owners’ of the 
corporation, and have the ability to elect and remove directors. Canadian courts and securities 
regulators have long struggled with this tension in determining the roles to be played by 
each in transactions that pose the potential for confl icts between and among boards and 
shareholders, such as transactions involving controlling shareholders or contested change 
of control transactions. For a number of reasons the Canadian regulatory regime has 
developed a shareholder-centric model, which tends to foster an emphasis on process and 
shareholder rights, and stands in sharp contrast to the American regime and its nuanced 
approach to director duties. We suggest that the way in which the Canadian regulatory 
regime has developed has displaced important corporate law concepts, negatively impacting 
the role to be played by boards and leading to shortcomings that have manifested themselves 
in a number of recent high-profi le cases. Our suggestion is a fundamental reconsideration 
of policy orientation. 
Il existe une tension fondamentale inhérente à la réglementation des sociétés entre le rôle 
du conseil d’administration et celui des actionnaires. Le conseil a la responsabilité légale 
de gérer l’entreprise et ses affaires, ainsi que l’obligation expresse d’agir dans le meilleur 
intérêt de cette dernière. Cependant, les actionnaires sont en fi n de compte propriétaires 
de l’entreprise et ils ont le pouvoir d’élire et de révoquer les administrateurs. Les 
tribunaux canadiens et les organismes de réglementation des valeurs mobilières doivent 
depuis longtemps composer avec cette tension pour déterminer le rôle que chacun doit 
jouer dans les transactions qui présentent une possibilité de conflits entre le conseil et les 
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actionnaires, notamment les transactions touchant les actionnaires dominants  ou les trans-
actions touchant un changement contesté de contrôle. Pour un certain nombre de raisons, 
le régime de réglementation canadien a élaboré un modèle axé sur l’actionnaire, qui tend à 
mettre l’accent sur la procédure établie et les droits des actionnaires, et se démarque fortement 
du système américain et de son approche nuancée envers les devoirs de l’administrateur. 
Nous suggérons que la manière dont le régime de réglementation canadien s’est développé 
a mis de côté d’importants concepts du droit des sociétés, ce qui a une incidence négative 
sur le rôle que doit jouer le conseil et mène à des lacunes qui se sont manifestées dans un 
certains nombre de cas récents très médiatisés. Nous suggérons un réexamen fondamental 
de l’orientation des politiques.
 THERE IS A BASIC TENSION inherent in the regulation of corporations between 
the role to be played by boards and that to be played by shareholders. In North 
America, this tension has been substantially infl uenced by the relative prevalence 
of securities regulation or corporate law. In this regard, the United States and 
Canada, while sharing a basic legal framework, have gone down very diff erent paths.
Shareholders are the ultimate ‘owners’ of the corporation, entitled to receive 
the residual profi ts and assets. Th ey elect the board of directors and, under Canadian 
corporate law, also have the ability to remove them. However, shareholders have 
little direct involvement in or responsibility for the day-to-day management of 
the corporation and generally owe no duties in connection with their actions as 
shareholders. Boards, on the other hand, have the express statutory authority to 
manage the business and aff airs of the corporation, and they have the duty to do 
so with a view to the corporation’s best interests. 
Th e diff erent roles allocated to boards and shareholders lead to potential 
confl icts that manifest themselves in a number of areas. Contested change-of-
control transactions and non-arm’s length transactions are two obvious examples, 
but the basic tension is systemic, and it is also evident in areas such as proxy 
access, executive compensation policies, and dilutive acquisition transactions. 
For a number of reasons, the Canadian regulatory regime for public companies—
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which is a mix of corporate law and securities regulation—has tended to favour 
shareholder choice and primacy by enacting specifi c rules and policies designed 
to emphasize and protect the rights of shareholders (versus emphasizing the 
responsibility of boards). Th e Canadian regulatory regime can be contrasted with 
that in the United States where—despite eff orts of the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and, through it, the stock exchanges—these issues 
have primarily been the purview of corporate law. Corporate law has been used to 
impose corporate governance standards, which generally tends to emphasize the 
prerogatives of the board of directors and the board’s concomitant responsibility 
to the corporation and its shareholders. 
As Canadian corporate law and securities regulation have evolved, the 
distinction between the roles to be played by shareholders and by boards has 
been sharpened. Th is change has brought into focus a growing tension between 
corporate law and securities regulators. Corporate law imposes statutory 
duties on directors and offi  cers; securities regulators, in addition to prescribing 
procedural standards to protect and empower shareholders, have invoked their 
broad “public interest”1 jurisdiction to interpret duties owed by directors and 
controlling shareholders. 
In the United States, the shareholder-centric versus director-centric debate 
has been both explicit and dynamic. In contrast, there has been relatively little 
debate in Canada until recently. Rather, the shift from a director-centric to a 
more shareholder-centric model has been a function of securities regulators 
occupying the fi eld. We suggest that by providing complainants with a fl exible 
and relatively quick process for adjudicating broadly framed “public interest” issues, 
Canadian securities regulators have displaced corporate law and its focus on the 
statutory duties of directors. Th is process has led to the creation of a self-reinforcing 
cycle. Th e securities regulators, which have the explicit goals of protecting 
investors and fostering fair and effi  cient capital markets, focus on the interests of 
shareholders and act to redress shareholder complaints by empowering them. Th e 
consequence has been the limitation of board authority and responsibility, with 
boards being either limited in their ability to manage the business and aff airs of 
the corporation (as is often the case in contested change-of-control transactions) 
or functionally sidelined (as is arguably the case in related-party transactions). 
Th is has in turn limited the development of Canadian corporate law and of the 
judicial competence required to eff ectively oversee the statutory duties of directors. 
Th e marginalization of corporate law in this area has led complainants to 
1. Securities Act, RSO 1960, c 363, s 127 [Act].
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continue to engage and appear in proceedings before the regulators, as opposed 
to the courts, and to frame complaints in terms of the “public interest” and 
shareholder rights as opposed to the statutory duties of directors. We suggest that 
this displacement of corporate law and consequential shift to a shareholder-centric 
model has left important questions or concepts of responsibility and authority 
unanswered or unexplored. 
Th e regulation of public companies is complex and requires balancing 
the interests of multiple groups, each of whom have a diff erent stake in the 
corporation. Securities regulation has empowered individual shareholders, but 
it has not solved (among other issues) the problem of eff ective collective action 
by those shareholders. It has also failed to address concerns relating to formal 
responsibility and accountability for shareholder decision making with regard 
to either the minority shareholders or other stakeholders in the corporation. 
Corporate law, in turn, has not developed meaningful mechanisms for overseeing 
the conduct of boards and the discharge of their responsibility to manage the 
business and aff airs of the corporation. Th e Canadian regulatory framework has 
illustrated some of these shortcomings in a number of recent high-profi le cases. 
To begin, we compare how the Canadian and American regimes operate in 
the context of similar transactions involving controlling shareholders. We discuss 
the recent decisions of the Delaware Chancery Court in In re Southern Peru Copper 
Corporation Shareholder Derivative Litigation2 and of the Ontario Securities 
Commission (the “Commission”) and Ontario courts in Re Magna International 
Inc.3 We then contrast the general development of the American and Canadian 
regulatory regimes for public companies, particularly in the context of transactions 
involving related parties or controlling shareholders. We conclude with a 
recommendation that it is time for a fundamental re-examination of the policy 
orientation in Canada. 
I. A STUDY IN CONTRASTS: SOUTHERN PERU VERSUS MAGNA
Th e diff erences between the United States and Canadian regulatory regimes are 
well illustrated by comparing and contrasting the recent decision of the Delaware 
2. 30 A (3d) 60, 2011 Del Ch LEXIS 162 [Southern Peru]. Th is judgment was affi  rmed by the 
Delaware Supreme Court in Americas Mining Corporation v Michael Th eriault, 2012 Del 
LEXIS 459.
3. (2010), 33 OSC Bull 6013, 72 BLR (4th) 235. For the additional reasons, see (2010) 34 OSC 
Bull 1290, 78 BLR (4th) 94 [Magna, Commission Reasons], aff ’d 2010 ONSC 4123, 101 OR 
(3d) 736 [Magna, Sup Ct], aff ’d 2010 ONSC 4685, 101 OR (3d) 721 [Magna, Div Ct].
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Chancery Court in Southern Peru with the decisions of the Commission and the 
Ontario Superior Court in Re Magna International Inc.
A. SOUTHERN PERU COPPER CORPORATION
Southern Peru Copper Corporation (“Southern Peru”) is a NYSE-listed mining 
company. In February 2004, its controlling stockholder, Grupo Mexico, S.A.B. 
de C.V. (Grupo Mexico), proposed a transaction under which Southern Peru 
would buy from Grupo Mexico its 99.15% stake in Minera Mexico, S.A. de 
C.V. (Minera), which was not a publicly listed company.4 Grupo Mexico initially 
proposed that Southern Peru purchase Grupo Mexico’s equity interest in Minera 
in exchange for 72.3 million shares of Southern Peru, which at the time had a 
market value of approximately 3.05 billion US dollars (“USD”). Southern Peru 
formed a special committee of disinterested directors to evaluate the transaction.5 
Th e special committee retained preeminent fi nancial and legal advisors. After 
eight months of discussions, the special committee approved the acquisition of 
Minera from Grupo Mexico in exchange for 67.2 million newly-issued shares of 
Southern Peru. At the time the transaction was approved by Southern Peru, these 
shares had a market value of approximately 3.1 billion USD, essentially the price 
initially proposed by Grupo Mexico for its interest in Minera. Southern Peru 
received a fairness opinion from its fi nancial advisor to the eff ect that the transaction 
was fair from a fi nancial perspective to the stockholders of Southern Peru and 
submitted the transaction for approval by its shareholders. Conditioned on a 
super-majority (as opposed to majority of the minority) vote, the transaction was 
ultimately approved, with more than 90% of the stockholders voting in favour 
of the transaction.6 
When the transaction with Grupo Mexico closed on 1 April 2005, the market 
value of the shares to be issued by Southern Peru in exchange for Minera had 
4. At the time, Southern Peru had two classes of stock: publicly traded common shares and 
“Founders Shares” that were owned by Grupo Mexico, as well as by Cerro Trading Company, 
Inc. and Phelps Dodge Corporation. Each Founders Share had fi ve votes per share, as 
compared to the one vote per share for the common stock. Grupo Mexico owned 43.3 
million Founders Shares, which translated into 54.17% of Southern Peru’s outstanding 
capital stock and 63.08% of the voting power. Grupo Mexico also had the right to nominate 
a majority of the Southern Peru board.
5. Th e mandate of the special committee formed by Southern Peru was to evaluate the 
transaction proposed by Grupo Mexico. Chancellor Strine noted that the special committee 
was not expressly empowered to negotiate the transaction and that it was not authorized to 
explore other strategic alternatives. Southern Peru, supra note 2 at 2.
6. Ibid at 69.
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increased to approximately 3.75 billion USD. Following the closing of the transaction, 
a representative plaintiff  for the Th eriault Trust sued the Grupo Mexico subsidiary 
that owned Minera, the Grupo Mexico-affi  liated directors of Southern Peru, and 
the members of the special committee of Southern Peru. Th e plaintiff  alleged 
that the transaction was unfair to Southern Peru and its minority stockholders. 
In other words, the plaintiff  alleged that Minera was not worth what Southern 
Peru had agreed to pay for it.7 
Under well-developed Delaware law, this transaction was evaluated on the 
“entire fairness” standard.8 Th is standard has two basic aspects: fair dealing and 
fair price. Th e fi rst requires an examination of the process by which the transaction 
was initiated, negotiated, and approved, while the second requires an analysis of 
whether the consideration was substantively fair.9 Although the test has two 
aspects, the analysis is not bifurcated. As noted by Chancellor Strine, “[T]he 
court ‘determines entire fairness based on all aspects of the entire transaction.’”10 
In non-fraudulent transactions, however, price can be a preponderant consideration: 
Fair dealing may help to demonstrate a fair price, but what ultimately matters the 
most is that there is a fair price. Th e obvious corollary is that transactions that are 
not substantively fair will not be saved by virtue of the process followed. 
After detailed and careful scrutiny of both the process by which the transaction 
was negotiated and approved and the price that was paid, Chancellor Strine 
determined that the transaction was not fair. He concluded that the special 
committee went fundamentally awry by allowing Grupo Mexico to dictate the 
terms and structure of the transaction, which foreclosed a meaningful consideration 
of alternatives that would have either generated a real market check or allowed it 
leverage to negotiate better terms.11 By allowing themselves to be constrained by 
the controlling stockholder’s demands, the special committee ultimately focused 
on trying to justify the terms of the transaction as proposed by Grupo Mexico 
instead of undertaking a meaningful analysis of whether Southern Peru ought 
to pursue the transaction at all. Th is focus hindered Southern Peru’s negotiating 
strength and posture. Chancellor Strine concluded that the special committee 
7. Ibid at 6.
8. Ibid at 93, 104-05.
9. William B Weinberger v UOP, Inc, 457 A 2d 701, 1983 Del Ch LEXIS 371 [Weinberger].
10. Southern Peru, supra note 2 at 88, citing In re John Q Hammons Hotels Inc Shareholder 
Litigation, 2009 Del Ch LEXIS 174 at para 44, WL 3165613 [Hammons].
11. Chancellor Strine noted, for example, that the special committee never seemed to consider 
the possibility of suggesting that Grupo Mexico purchase Southern Peru, which could have 
altered the deal dynamics in a way that gave the special committee leverage. Southern Peru, 
supra note 2 at 73.
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was trapped in a “controlled mindset”12 where the only options to be considered 
were those proposed by the controlling shareholder, observing that, “[e]ven if the 
practical reality is that the controlling [share]holder has the power to reject any 
alternate proposal it does not support, the special committee still benefi ts from a 
full exploration of its options.”13
Chancellor Strine found that this fundamentally misguided orientation of 
the special committee manifested itself when the fi nancial advisor to Southern 
Peru was initially unable to value Minera at a level that approximated Grupo 
Mexico’s asking price. Rather than causing the special committee to make a 
strong response to the initial off er, the special committee and its fi nancial advisor 
undertook a strenuous attempt to “equalize” the value of Minera and Southern 
Peru, ultimately devaluing Southern Peru and writing up the value of Minera 
in order to justify the asking price put forward by the controlling stockholder.14 
In a lengthy and detailed review of the valuation exercises undertaken by 
the special committee and its fi nancial advisor, Chancellor Strine concluded that 
the special committee’s actions were not consistent with its fi duciary duties 
or with how an arm’s length third party would act.15 Rather than seeking to 
maximize credit for the value of the Southern Peru stock to be issued as part of 
the transaction, the special committee ended up trying to rationalize a relatively 
greater value for Minera while discounting the otherwise market-tested value 
of Southern Peru’s stock. In the result, Chancellor Strine found that the special 
committee agreed to “give away” stock with an actual value of over 3 billion USD 
in exchange for something worth demonstrably less; moreover, it did so on terms 
(i.e., an agreement to issue a fi xed number of shares of Southern Peru stock, as 
opposed to a fl oating number based on the market price of Southern Peru stock) 
that made the value gap substantially worse by the time it closed.16 As a 
consequence, Chancellor Strine awarded damages of 1.26 billion USD against 
the controlling shareholder and its nominee directors on the Southern Peru 
board. Chancellor Strine determined that this compensation would approximate 
value in a “fair” transaction.17
12. Ibid at 111.
13. Ibid at 100.
14. Ibid at 101.
15. Ibid at 160.
16. Ibid at 113.
17. Members of the special committee were insulated from liability because of an exculpatory 
provision in the company’s charter, as is permitted under Delaware corporate law.
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B. THE MAGNA PROCEEDINGS
In 2010, the board of Magna International Inc. (Magna) submitted to shareholders 
a plan of arrangement under the Ontario Business Corporations Act, the eff ect of 
which was to collapse the dual class share structure through which Frank Stronach 
(Magna’s founder and then-Chair) had exercised control over the company since 
1978. In return for incurring an unprecedented 11.4% dilution of their equity, 
the subordinate voting Class A Shares—which carried one vote each, did not 
have “coat-tail” protection (i.e., a mechanism designed to allow the subordinate 
voting shares to participate in a premium off er for the high voting shares), and 
were not subject to a “sunset” provision—were converted into a single class of 
Common Shares. Mr. Stronach’s Class B Shares, carrying 300 votes each, were 
eliminated. Based on the market price of the Class A Shares immediately before 
the proposed transaction was announced, Mr. Stronach obtained a premium of 
approximately 1,800% in exchange for giving up control of Magna. Th e terms 
of the transaction were substantially negotiated between management and Mr. 
Stronach prior to the involvement of the board or the special committee. Th e 
transaction was structured to be conditional on minority shareholder approval, 
which was obtained by a decisive 75% majority (80.4% of the issued Class A 
Shares were represented and voting at the meeting). Mr. Stronach made it clear to 
the special committee that if shareholders chose to reject the proposed transaction, 
he would be happy to preserve the status quo.18
A number of major Canadian pension funds opposed the transaction,19 
initially by supporting a Commission Staff  application to the Commission to 
cease-trade it on the basis that it was contrary to the public interest. Th ey later 
intervened in proceedings before the Ontario Superior Court to dispute the 
fairness and reasonableness of the plan of arrangement.20 In contrast, a majority 
18. Magna, Div Ct, supra note 3 at para 28-30.
19. Th e Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan acquired a single share so that it could have standing 
at the Commission hearing and be a complainant/appellant in the judicial proceedings, 
presumably refl ecting a concern as to the precedential impact of the transaction.
20. It is interesting to note that the opposing shareholders did not seek relief under the statutory 
oppression remedy, presumably because, among other things, it imposes the initial burden 
on the complaining party (rather than the controlling shareholder or the board) to challenge 
the fairness of the transaction. In contrast, under an “entire fairness” review in Delaware, it 
is the board that bears the burden of establishing that the impugned transaction is entirely 
fair, although it can shift this burden if certain procedural protections have been put in place. 
Moreover, in a previous oppression application that had been brought against Mr. Stronach 
in connection with a related company, the Ontario Superior Court had shown deference 
to the decisions of the board: “[T]he court only requires that the directors make a decision 
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of the minority shareholders were involved in proposing the transaction to 
Mr. Stronach and committed (with him) to vote in its favour. Between the 
announcement of the proposed transaction on 6 May 2010 and the end of that 
month, Magna’s Class A Share price increased by 7.9%.21 Two months after the 
announcement the price was still up 6.9%, despite declines of 4% in the S&P/
TSX Index, 9.1% in the S&P 500 Index, and 13.5% in the stock prices of Magna’s 
US comparables.22
Th e Commission held a two-day hearing, the bulk of which was taken up 
with argument by the parties, including Commission Staff . Shortly afterward it 
determined that, while the disclosure in the proxy circular that Magna had submitted 
to its shareholders was inadequate, “once the issue of adequate disclosure was 
addressed, there were no valid grounds for us to conclude in the circumstances 
that the Proposed Transaction was abusive of Class A Shareholders or should 
be restrained on other grounds.”23 Th e Commission noted, however, that had 
shareholder approval not been a pre-condition for the transaction, “we have little 
doubt that we would have restrained it as an abusive related-party transaction.”24 
While the Commission noted that “[i]t is clear from Commission decisions that 
any view or perception that we may have as to the possible unfairness of a transaction 
is not a suffi  cient ground upon which we can or should intervene in the public 
which is within a range of reasonableness and the courts will not interfere with the selection 
by the directors of one of several reasonable alternatives.” Greenlight Capital Inc v Stronach 
(2006), 22 BLR (4th) 11 at para 30, 152 ACWS (3d) 616 (Ont Sup Ct), aff ’d (2008), 91 
OR (3d) 241, 47 BLR (4th) 215 (Div Ct).
21. Magna International Inc. Management Information Circular/Proxy Statement (May 31, 
2010) at 35. Th e increase occurred despite signifi cant declines in equity markets and, in 
particular, comparable U.S. companies. It was argued that a portion of the increase in share 
price was attributable to the contemporaneous announcement of favourable results and a 
dividend. See Edward Iacobucci, “Making Sense of Magna” (2011) 49:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 
237. Iacobucci, while fi nding faults in the process, endorsed the outcome on the basis that 
informed minority shareholder approval was not likely aff ected by the procedural defects he 
identifi ed (ibid at 271-72).
22. Magna, Sup Ct, supra note 3 at para 84.
23. Ibid; Magna, Commission Reasons, supra note 3 at para 193. It should be noted that the 
Commission released its written reasons approximately six months after its decision and well 
after the court fairness hearing and judicial review thereof.
24. Magna, Sup Ct, supra note 3 at para 190. It also concluded, however, that the proposed 
transaction did not contravene Multilateral Instrument 61-101, the securities rule that 
otherwise governs related-party transactions. Th e Commission thus concluded that the 
proposed transaction was not contrary to any established securities laws or regulations. Th e 
Commission’s substantive review was based solely on its “public interest” jurisdiction.
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interest,”25 it also observed that, if a transaction is abusive of shareholders or the 
capital markets, “then shareholder approval will not be suffi  cient.”26
Th e Commission rejected arguments that the Magna board had failed to 
comply with its fi duciary duties, noting, “We have no reason to believe that by 
submitting the Proposed Transaction to shareholders for their consideration in 
these circumstances, the Magna board or special committee improperly delegated 
that decision to shareholders or thereby breached their fi duciary duties.”27 Finally, 
while the Commission was highly critical of the process followed by the Magna 
board and special committee—declaring that “… the Special Committee process 
appears to have been tainted by the involvement of executive management at the 
start of and during the process, and the Special Committee’s mandate and terms 
of reference were too narrow and fundamentally fl awed”28 —it concluded that it 
did not have suffi  cient grounds to justify intervening in the transaction on that 
basis.29 In the result, an amended proxy circular containing an unprecedented 
level of disclosure was submitted to shareholders prior to the vote, and a 
subsequent “fairness hearing” was held before Justice Wilton-Siegel of the Ontario 
Superior Court.30 In the court’s decision on the fairness and reasonableness of the 
proposed plan of arrangement, Justice Wilton-Siegel applied the principles 
established by the Supreme Court of Canada in BCE,31 noting that: 
[T]he court must focus on the terms and impact of the arrangement itself, rather than 
on the process by which it was reached. … [T]he corporation [seeking approval] bears 
the onus of satisfying the court that: (1) the statutory procedures have been met; (2) 
the application has been put forward in good faith; and (3) the arrangement is fair and 
reasonable … .32
Th e court rejected the notion that the directors owed a duty to the Class A 
shareholders, as distinct from Magna:
Th ere is no such duty under corporate law in a related party transaction, however 
desirable such a requirement might be. In allowing the transaction to be put before 
25. Ibid at para 193.
26. Ibid at para 195.
27. Ibid at para 201. 
28. Ibid at para 226.
29. Ibid at para 228.
30. Magna, Sup Ct, supra note 3. 
31. BCE v 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560 [BCE]. It should be 
noted that commercial courts (including the Supreme Court of Canada in BCE) have often 
evidenced their responsiveness to the exigencies of markets by expediting the hearing and 
resolution of corporate disputes. 
32. Magna, Sup Ct, supra note 3 at para 101, citing BCE, ibid at paras 136-37.
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the Class A shareholders, the OSC Panel also determined that no such obligation 
existed under securities law.33
Ultimately, the court determined that the Class A shareholder vote could 
reasonably be regarded as a proxy for the substantive (as opposed to procedural) 
fairness and reasonableness of the arrangement. It noted that, in concluding that 
the business judgment rule is not useful in the context of statutory arrangements, 
the Court in BCE “actually reinforced the need to rely on the outcome of a 
shareholder vote in appropriate circumstances.”34 Hence, while unable to make 
its own factual determination, the court ruled that Magna had satisfi ed the 
requirements of the “fair and reasonable” test under the criteria set out in BCE 
and approved the proposed transaction. An appeal to the Divisional Court was 
dismissed unanimously.35
C. DIFFERING APPROACHES AND RELATIVE INSTITUTIONAL 
COMPETENCIES 
While the facts in Southern Peru and Magna diff er,36 the contrasting results 
exemplify the divergent regulatory regimes in Canada and the United States and 
the diff erent approaches taken to broadly similar questions. In the United States 
the issue of related-party transactions is ultimately within the purview of 
corporate law and proceeds from a principled examination of whether the board 
has discharged its fi duciary duties. Th e analysis requires an examination of not 
only whether the process followed was fair but, more critically, whether the 
ultimate result was fair. As illustrated by Southern Peru, this is a substantive analysis, 
which allows a nuanced review of board and shareholder conduct and can off er 
minority shareholders substantial protection. 
By contrast, in Magna the focus was less on the substantive merits of the 
transaction and more on the nature of its approval by shareholders. Th e approach 
of the Commission, which was framed on the one hand by the specifi c rules of 
Multilateral Instrument 61-10137 and on the other by a broad but not clearly defi ned 
33. Magna, Sup Ct, supra note 3 at para 149. 
34. Ibid at para 162.
35. Magna, Div Ct, supra note 3 at para 79.
36. For example, in Magna the transaction was conditioned on approval by a majority of the 
minority shareholders. Also, Southern Peru featured a more classic “zero sum” transaction, 
whereas it is arguable that in Magna both the Class A shareholders and the Stronach family 
interests were able to benefi t from the transaction, even if the relative shares of the benefi t 
were disputable.
37. Protection of Minority Security Holders in Special Transactions, OSC MI 61-101, 31 OSCB 
1321 (1 February 2008) [Multilateral Instrument 61-101].
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“public interest” jurisdiction, seems to have admitted a “principle” gap—the lack 
of a clear basis on which to review the substantive merits of the transaction.38 
Hence, its analysis was largely confi ned to one of disclosure and procedure, with 
the emphasis being on the nature and quality of shareholder approval. Similarly, 
at the court, the question of substantive fairness was ultimately collapsed into 
the question of whether a suffi  cient majority of shareholders had approved the 
transaction on a fully informed basis.
Th e approach taken in Magna is, we suggest, a function of how the Canadian 
regulatory regime in respect of related-party transactions has developed and the 
way in which the “public interest” jurisdiction of the Canadian securities regulators 
has displaced the development of corporate law concepts. Th e emphasis by the 
Commission on the protection of shareholder rights, and the concomitant bias 
toward the empowerment of shareholders as compared to boards, has diminished 
the role of boards of directors in related-party transactions.39 As a consequence, 
Canadian courts have simply not developed nuanced judicial doctrines for 
reviewing transactions involving related parties in public companies. Th e “public 
interest” jurisdiction of securities regulators has not adequately fi lled this gap.
Elsewhere, we have described similar displacement eff ects with respect to the 
regulation of takeover defensive tactics.40 Until the Commission’s decision in Re 
Canadian Tire Corp,41 the respective roles of the Commission and the courts were 
relatively clearly defi ned—the Commission was essentially restricted to granting 
exemptive relief and to acting as a complainant before the courts. Since 1987, 
38. As Iacobucci notes, this gap may well be the state of the law following the Court’s decision in 
BCE, which eff ectively gives boards wide and unguided discretion. Iacobucci, supra note 21 
at 267.
39. Of course, it can be argued that shareholders ultimately bear the consequences of their 
choices, and so should have the ability to decide their fate. Th is fails to distinguish, however, 
between individual shareholders and the shareholders as a body. More fundamentally, it also 
glosses over the distinction between the best interests of the corporation and the best interests 
of (individual) shareholders. Th e board of directors owes a duty to act in the best interests 
of the corporation itself. Shareholders, on the other hand, act in their own interests. If it is 
the shareholders that ultimately manage the business and aff airs of the corporation, then the 
issues of collective action (and collective responsibility) will need to be addressed. 
40. Sean Vanderpol & Ed Waitzer, “Mediating Rights and Responsibilities in Control 
Transactions” (2010) 48 Osgoode Hall LJ 639.
41. (1987), 10 OSC Bull 857, 35 BLR 56 [Re Canadian Tire], aff ’d sub nom CTC Dealer 
Holdings Ltd v Ontario Securities Commission, (1987), 37 DLR (4th) 94, 59 OR (2d) 79. In 
this case, the OSC used its cease-trade power without fi nding a breach of the Act, regulations 
or policy statements “to deal with situations that are inconsistent with the best interests of 
investors or where a transaction constitutes a fl agrant abuse of the marketplace” (Re Canadian 
Tire, ibid at 929). 
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however, the Commission and the courts have exercised substantial and often 
overlapping powers. Not surprisingly, the Commission has been viewed as 
having particular expertise. Similarly, it enjoys procedural fl exibility that may 
off er advantages when quick decisions must be made based on limited evidence 
and argument. Conversely, the Commission’s expertise and procedural fl exibility 
leave it more susceptible to the risks inherent in quick decisions rendered as 
events are unfolding. In contrast, courts tend to deal with issues slowly and after 
the fact. Th eir decisions are informed by a disciplined evidentiary process and 
assume prospective signifi cance. 
Th e Commission’s ability to determine whether and when it will entertain 
applications for relief and the Commission Staff ’s ability to initiate applications 
and intervene of their own accord have proven potent instruments to give eff ect 
to the policy biases of Canadian securities regulation. One example is National 
Policy 62-202 – Take-Over Bids – Defensive Tactics, which states that “[t]he 
primary objective of the take-over bid provisions of Canadian securities legislation 
is the protection of the bona fi de interests of the shareholders of the target 
company.”42 In the case of contested control transactions, the result has been 
a long line of decisions by Canadian securities regulators establishing that it 
is the shareholders, rather than the board of directors, who decide whether a 
corporation is for sale. Even if the board decides to implement defensive tactics, 
Canadian securities regulators will typically override the business judgment of 
the board in short order (70 to 90 days) in order to allow shareholders to decide 
on the proposed transaction.43 While there are grounds to argue that this approach 
is inconsistent with the duties and authority granted to boards under Canadian 
corporate law,44 the displacement eff ect described above has generally deterred 
resort to the courts, either in the fi rst instance or for judicial review of a 
regulatory decision.45 
Th e primacy of the securities regulators, as compared to the courts, in the 
regulation of public companies is not inherent in the role played by each. It is, 
rather, a function of the development of corporate law and securities regulation 
42. OSC NP 62-202 (4 August 1997), s 1.1(2). Th is contrasts sharply with US corporate law, 
where the regulation of substantive decision-making by directors in the context of a change 
of control transaction is left to the courts.
43. See Vanderpol & Waitzer, supra note 40.
44. As stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in BCE, supra note 31 at para 38, “Th e fi duciary 
duty of the directors to the corporation is a broad, contextual concept. It is not confi ned to 
short-term profi t or share value. Where the corporation is an ongoing concern, it looks to the 
long-term interests of the corporation.”
45. See Vanderpol & Waitzer, supra note 40.
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in Canada. With the benefi t of hindsight, some have commented on what might 
have transpired in Magna had the complaining shareholders not sought relief 
at the Commission.46 Th e Commission allotted only two days for the “public interest” 
hearing and ultimately acknowledged that it was not equipped to consider 
substantive fairness or the eff ectiveness of the process undertaken by the board 
and special committee. Moreover, it is clear that the enhanced level of 
disclosure provided as a result of the Commission’s decision gave additional 
weight to the shareholder vote at the statutory fairness hearing. Further, the 
Commission’s highly critical reasons were not available to the court, which, 
in turn, did not consider procedural fairness. In contrast to Southern Peru, 
shareholder approval was determinative. The transaction proceeded on 
substantially the same terms initially agreed to by the controlling shareholder, 
notwithstanding the Commission’s view that the special committee of Magna 
had succumbed to the “controlled mindset”47 described by Chancellor Strine. 
II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES: THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINT
Unlike Canada, US constitutional law reserves corporate law for the states, while 
securities regulation is primarily federal. As the US Supreme Court has stated:
Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate 
directors on the understanding that, except where federal law expressly requires 
certain responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern 
the internal aff airs of the corporation.48
Given this demarcation of powers, the US Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia vacated SEC Rule 19c-4,49 adopted in 1988, which purported to 
bar national securities exchanges and the National Association of Securities 
Dealers from listing companies that took any action “with the eff ect of nullifying, 
restricting or disparately reducing the per share voting rights of [existing common 
stockholders].”50 Th e Rule was designed to promote one vote per share for listed 
46. Kent E Th omson, James D Bunting & J Alexander Moore, “Th e Magna Proceedings: 
Devising a Litigation Strategy and Elaboration on the BCE Test” in Lexpert/American Lawyer 
Guide to the Leading 500 Lawyers in Canada (Th omson Reuters Canada, 2011).
47. Southern Peru, supra note 2 at 111.
48. Santa Fe Industries, Inc, et al v Green et al, 430 US 462 at 479, 97 S Ct 1292 (USSC, 1977), 
citing Cort et al v Ash, 422 US 66 at 84, 95 S Ct 2080 (USSC, 1975) [emphasis added]. 
49. 17 CFR § 240.19c-4 (1990).
50. See Business Roundtable v SEC, 905 F 2d 406 at 407, 284 US App DC 301 (DC Cir 1990).
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companies. Th e Court did not question the wisdom of the requirement or the 
propriety of its imposition at the federal level. It nonetheless struck down the 
Rule, holding that there was no specifi c authorization in the SEC’s governing 
legislation. Likewise, it rejected the SEC’s argument that authorization could 
be found in the provisions allowing the SEC, in registering an exchange (or 
association of brokers and dealers), to consider whether its rules “in general, … 
protect investors and the public interest.”51 Th e Court held that a vague “public 
interest” standard could not be interpreted without some confi ning principle and 
that the SEC’s assertion of authority invaded the “fi rmly established” jurisdiction 
of the states over corporate governance and shareholder voting rights.52
As a result of this constitutional constraint, securities regulation in the 
United States has tended to be more narrowly focused than in Canada. As a 
consequence, we argue, corporate law jurisprudence has been more robust in the 
United States than in Canada. American courts have taken a fl exible approach 
to the scope of directors’ duties under corporate law.53 Th e basic foundations of 
this jurisprudence are the duties of care and loyalty and the duty of directors 
to manage the business and aff airs of the corporation—the same basic duties of 
boards of Canadian corporations. From these foundations, US corporate law, 
and especially Delaware corporate law, has developed a number of key judicial 
doctrines that govern the conduct of boards and controlling shareholders, 
including the business judgment rule, “enhanced scrutiny,” and the entire 
fairness standard.54 
51. Ibid at 413.
52. Ibid, citing CTS Corp v Dynamics Corporation of America, 481 US 69 at 89, 107 S Ct 1637 
(USSC 1987). More recently, the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
struck down the SEC’s Rule 14 a-11 in Business Roundtable v SEC, 647 F 3d 1144, 396 US 
App DC 259 (DC Cir). Th is was the SEC’s attempt (pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L No 111-203, 124 Stat 1376 (2010)) to give 
shareholders the right under federal proxy rules to have their director nominees included in 
management proxy materials. In this instance, the rule was struck down on the basis that 
the SEC had failed to adequately justify it on a cost-benefi t basis. It was not clear whether 
the court had set a high threshold for such justifi cation because of the fact that the SEC was 
addressing issues traditionally left to the states (notwithstanding clear legislative authority for 
the SEC in this instance).
53. For example, the California Supreme Court noted that traditional fi duciary law “failed to 
aff ord adequate protection to minority shareholders” and, in the context of the facts of the 
case before it, decided to impose upon a controlling shareholder a “comprehensive rule of 
good faith and inherent fairness to the minority in any transaction where control of the 
corporation is material[.]” June K Jones v HF Ahmanson & Company et al, 1 Cal 3d 93 at 
111-12, 460 P 2d 464 (1969).
54. See e.g. Julian Velasco, “Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review” (2004) 82 
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Th e business judgment rule is a familiar concept. It is the basic standard 
by which the actions of directors of a Delaware corporation are reviewed. In 
recognition of the fact that it is the directors, not the shareholders, who manage 
the business and aff airs of a corporation, the business judgment rule operates 
to protect the business decisions of boards from judicial “second-guessing” so 
long as those decisions were made in good faith by disinterested and informed 
directors.55 Delaware law has recognized, however, that this standard of review 
is not appropriate in all circumstances. It has therefore developed the concept 
of “enhanced scrutiny,” an intermediate standard of review that applies when 
the business judgment rule is not appropriate. Under this standard, the court 
reviews the process and information relied upon by the board as well as the 
reasonableness of its decision.56 Th e two most important circumstances in which 
enhanced scrutiny applies are takeover defenses and board review of shareholder 
derivative litigation. Th e logic in each case is that the inherent confl ict arising 
from management’s and the board’s interest in retaining control or in avoiding 
shareholder claims requires enhanced scrutiny.
“Entire fairness” is the most exacting standard of review. In a transaction 
that is reviewed on this standard, courts will look to both the process (“fair 
dealing”) and the price (“fair price”) in determining whether the transaction is 
“entirely fair.”57 Th e Delaware courts have taken a broad view of the circumstances 
in which to apply the “entire fairness” standard. For example, in In re Loral Space 
and Communications Inc Consolidated Litigation, the court applied the standard to a 
board’s approval of fi nancing from a controlling (though not majority) shareholder.58 
Th e court found a lack of fair dealing based on the “fl awed” composition of 
the special committee, which consisted of two directors—one independent and 
Washington U L Quart 821.
55. Senior Aronson, et al v Harry Lewis, 473 A 2d 805 at 811, 1984 Del LEXIS 305 (Ch). Th e 
court noted that 
[a] cardinal precept of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware is that direc-
tors, rather than shareholders, manage the business and aff airs of the corporation.” As a 
consequence, there is a “presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action 
taken was in the best interests of the company... . Absent an abuse of discretion, that judgment 
will be respected by the courts. (Ibid at 812).
56. Martin Lipton & Th eodore N Mirvis, “Enhanced Scrutiny and Corporate Performance: Th e 
New Frontier for Corporate Directors” (1995) 20 Del J Corp L 123.
57. See Weinberger, supra note 9; Cinerama, Inc v Technicolor, Inc, 663 A 2d 1134, 1994 Del Ch 
LEXIS 178, aff ’d 663 A 2d 1156, 1995 Del LEXIS 251 (Ch). See also Julian Velasco, “How 
Many Fiduciary Duties are there in Corporate Law?” (2010) 83:6 S Cal L Rev 1231 at 1244.
58. 2008 Del Ch LEXIS 136.
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one affi  liated with the controlling shareholder. Th e court further stated that the 
special committee had a “cramped view of its mandate” and had used a fi nancial 
advisor that, in the court’s view, was “not qualifi ed to swim in the deep end.”59 
Holding that there was no fair price, the court fashioned a remedy by rewriting 
the fi nancing arrangements to rectify the harm.60
In Khan v Lynch Communication Systems, Inc, the court suggested that the 
entire fairness standard was appropriate for any merger involving a controlling 
shareholder, irrespective of whether the transaction was negotiated by an 
independent special committee, approved by an independent board majority, 
or subject to a majority-of-the-minority vote condition.61 Th e court based its 
conclusion on a determination that such protective provisions are insuffi  cient in 
light of the coercion that inheres whenever a controlling shareholder indicates its 
intention to buy the minority’s shares.62 Recognizing the utility of such protective 
measures, the court suggested that their use could shift the burden of proof on 
the issue of fairness from the controlling shareholder (and target board) to the 
shareholder plaintiff s.63
Unlike the regulatory framework imposed by Canadian securities laws, US 
corporate law imposes few constraints on the controlling shareholder’s ability to 
sell control at a premium that is not shared with non-controlling shareholders,64 
perhaps because it imposes constraints on the private benefi ts of control that fl ow 
from ongoing operations.65 However, US courts have developed some limitations 
on the ability to sell control at a premium.66 In In re Tele-Communications, Inc 
Shareholders Litigation, the court denied a motion for summary judgment in 
59. Ibid at paras 77, 81, 84.
60. Ibid at paras 114-20.
61. 638 A 2d 1110, 1994 Del LEXIS 112 (Ch) [Lynch]. 
62. Ibid at 1116.
63. Ibid at 1117.
64. Although in Perlman v Feldmann the court held that control premiums must be shared with 
non-controlling shareholders, the US law has since changed radically. 219 F 2d 173, 50 ALR 
2d 1134 (2d Cir 1955).
65. See Ronald J Gilson & Jeff rey N Gordon, “Controlling Controlling Shareholders” (2003) 
152:2 U Pa L Rev 785 at 794.
66. Th e American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance restrict a controlling 
shareholder’s right to sell control at a premium if:
the controlling shareholder does not make disclosure concerning the transaction to other share-
holders with whom the controlling shareholder deals in connection with the transaction; or
it is apparent from the circumstances that the purchaser is likely to violate the duty of fair deal-
ing … in such a way as to obtain a signifi cant fi nancial benefi t for the purchaser or an associate.
 Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations, loose-leaf (consulted on 25 
January 2012) (American Law Institute, 2005), ch 5 at s 5.16.
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respect of a transaction whereby AT&T acquired TCI by paying a 10% premium 
for the high-vote Class B shares (mostly held by the controlling shareholder).67 
Th e court reviewed the transaction under the “entire fairness” standard not merely 
because the controlling shareholder received a premium but because a majority of 
the company’s directors were beneficiaries of the premium and therefore 
interested in the transaction.68 Th e court found that the special committee process 
was fl awed: No fairness opinion was received, the special committee’s mandate 
was unclear, and, for various reasons, several of its members were confl icted.69
Likewise, in In re John Q Hammons Hotels Inc Shareholder Litigation, the 
Delaware Chancery Court applied the entire fairness standard to a third-party 
merger in which the majority shareholder received a premium for its shares.70 
Distinguishing Lynch, the Court held that entire fairness should be the standard 
unless the transaction was both recommended by an independent committee 
and approved by shareholders in a non-waivable “majority of all of the minority” 
vote.71 Th e court was concerned that “Hammons and the minority stockholders 
were, in a sense ‘competing’ for portions of the consideration Elian [the disinterested 
acquirer] was willing to pay to acquire JQH and that Hammons, as a result 
of his controlling position, could eff ectively veto any transaction.”72 Th e court 
downplayed the fact that minority shareholders were entitled to vote “because 
the vote could have been waived by the special committee and because the vote 
only required approval of a majority of the minority stockholders voting on the 
matter, rather than a majority of all the minority stockholders.”73 
In In re Delphi Financial Group Shareholder Litigation,74 Vice-Chancellor 
Glasscock of the Delaware Court of Chancery found that the plaintiff s had a 
reasonable likelihood of success in showing a breach of duty by Delphi’s CEO 
and controlling shareholder, who negotiated a friendly transaction in which he 
would receive 53.88 USD for each of his (10 vote) Class B shares while the 
public shareholders of Delphi would receive 44.88 USD for each of their (single 
vote) Class A shares. Th e court reached the decision to allow the transaction to 
proceed despite its determination as to likelihood of success (based on a provision 
in Delphi’s certifi cate of incorporation that provided for automatic conversion 
67. CA No 16470 (Del Ct Ch 2005), 2005 Del Ch LEXIS 206 [In re Tele-Communications].
68. Ibid at paras 25-26.
69. Ibid at 54-57. 
70. Hammons, supra note 10.
71. Ibid at para 38.
72. Ibid at para 41.
73. Ibid.
74. In re Delphi Financial Group Shareholder Litigation, 2012 WL 729232 (Del Ch).
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of Class B shares to Class A shares upon a sale and the special committee’s 
attempt to persuade Delphi’s CEO to accept the same consideration as the Class 
A shareholders). Th e court allowed the transaction to proceed because it was at a 
substantial premium and any harms could be remedied by damages. Delphi later 
announced that it had agreed to settle the shareholder litigation by paying the 
Class A shareholders consideration equivalent to that to be received by the Class 
B shareholders.75
As noted above, the use of a special committee (duly constituted, with 
independent fi nancial and legal advice, and demonstrating an ability and willingness to 
diligently and actively “negotiate the highest or best available transaction for the 
shareholders whom they undertook to represent”)76 will often shift the burden of 
proof in an entire fairness review to the plaintiff . Another way to shift the burden 
is to obtain the fully informed approval of a majority of the minority stockholders.77 In 
either circumstance, however, the issue before the courts is whether the impugned 
transaction is entirely fair from both a substantive and a procedural perspective. 
III. CANADIAN COMMON LAW CONSTRAINTS ON THE 
CONDUCT OF SHAREHOLDERS
Building on the key concepts of care, loyalty, and the duty of directors to manage 
the business and aff airs of the corporation, the Delaware courts have developed a 
fl exible set of judicial doctrines designed to review board conduct and the actions 
of controlling shareholders in a variety of situations. Entire fairness and enhanced 
scrutiny are the two primary standards of review.78 Th ere are others, however. For 
example, in the event of an inevitable sale or break up of a company, the duty of 
directors is to secure the highest price for the shareholders.79
Canadian courts have eff ectively (if somewhat obliquely) affi  rmed the 
business judgment rule80 and required that directors exercise their powers with 
75. Delphi Financial Group, Inc, News Release, “Delphi Financial Announces Settlement with 
Class Action Plaintiff s Regarding Acquisition by Tokio Marine,” (9 April 2012), online: 
<http://www.delphifi n.com/news/DFG_Announces_Settlement_with_Class_Action_
Plaintiff s.pdf>. 
76. In re Trans World Airlines, Inc Shareholders Litigation, 1988 Del Ch LEXIS 139 at para 12.
77. See e.g. Emerald Partners v Berlin, 726 A 2d 1215 at 1223, 1999 Del LEXIS 97 (Ch). 
78. See Velasco, supra note 54 at 1246-47.
79. See Revlon, Inc v MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc, 506 A 2d 173 at 182, 1986 Del LEXIS 
1053 (Ch). 
80. See BCE, supra note 31.
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a “proper purpose.”81 Th ese concepts are, however, less developed in Canadian 
jurisprudence than in the United States, notwithstanding the fact that Canadian 
corporate law shares many of the same basic foundations as Delaware corporate 
law. Also, Canadian corporate law has not developed a doctrine for imposing 
duties on controlling shareholders of public companies or for reviewing the 
substantive fairness of transactions with controlling shareholders.82 Th is is not to 
say that there are no concepts in Canadian corporate law that could address these 
situations. For example, the oppression remedy found in the Canada Business 
Corporations Act (and other Canadian corporate law statutes) gives the courts a 
wide range of powers to remedy conduct that is oppressive, that is unfairly prejudicial, 
or that unfairly disregards the interests of a shareholder (among others).83 Th e 
foundation of the oppression remedy is, however, the “reasonable expectations” 
of the complainant.84 Th is concept has proven diffi  cult to apply in managing 
rights and responsibilities as between the security holders and directors of a public 
company. In the Court’s decision in BCE, the question of reasonable expectations 
ultimately shaded into a question of whether the board of directors was acting in 
accordance with its fi duciary duties—an issue that was analyzed by reference to 
the business judgment rule.85 
Although the Court has yet to impose formal duties or constraints on the 
shareholders of public companies, there is ample historical precedent for doing 
so in the common law. Th e House of Lords decision in Ebrahimi v Westbourne 
Galleries Ltd et al is frequently credited as the antecedent to the modern Canadian 
oppression remedy. 86 Th e case involved a private corporation with three shareholders 
who were also directors. Two shareholders (a father and son) removed the other 
as a director in compliance with the corporate articles and governing legislation. 
The House of Lords granted a winding-up order on “just and equitable” 
81. Hogg v Cramphorn, Ltd, [1966] 3 All ER 420, [1967] Ch 254; Teck Corp v Millar (1972), 33 
DLR (3d) 288 at para 3, [1973] 2 WWR 385 (BCSC).
82. See e.g. Maple Leaf Foods Inc et al v Schneider Corp et al, 42 OR (3d) 177, 44 BLR (2d) 
115 (CA). In this case, the Court of Appeal affi  rmed the trial judge’s determination that 
the directors, in allowing the controlling shareholder to enter into a “lock-up” agreement, 
acted in good faith and were entitled to deference. Th e court found that the directors had no 
obligation to keep the bidding process alive (notwithstanding an extant higher bid) given the 
controlling shareholders’ indication that they would not tender to the higher bid.
83. RSC 1985, c C-44, s 241(2) [CBCA].
84. BCE, supra note 31 at para 56.  See also Ed Waitzer & Johnny Jaswal, “Peoples, BCE, and the 
Good Corporate ‘Citizen’” (2009) 47:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 439.
85. Ibid at para 40. 
86. [1972] 2 All ER 492, [1973] AC 360 (HL).
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principles after considering the reasonable expectations of the minority shareholder 
in the context.87
Earlier cases imposed a duty of good faith on controlling shareholders. In 
Allen v Gold Reefs of West Africa, Limited, shareholders wished to make a claim 
against an insolvent estate. Th ey passed a special resolution that amended the 
corporate articles to give the company a lien on fully paid shares, all of which 
were held by the estate.88 While he acknowledged that the governing statute 
allowed such an amendment, Lord Lindley held that:
Wide, however, as the language of … [the statute] is, the power conferred by it 
must, like all other powers, be exercised subject to those general principles of law 
and equity which are applicable to all powers conferred on majorities and enabling 
them to bind minorities. It must be exercised, not only in a manner required by 
law, but also bonâ fi de for the benefi t of the company as a whole, and it must not 
be exceeded.89
Although the Privy Council specifi cally rejected the application of a “majority 
of the minority” test in North-West Transportation Company v Beatty,90 several 
cases have applied some variation of the principle to constrain conduct that 
unfairly favours controlling shareholders. In British America Nickel Corporation 
v MJ O’Brien, the company promised to pay the holder of 70% of a class of 
bonds 2 million Canadian dollars (“CAD”) worth of common stock in order to 
secure his vote for a proposed reorganization.91 Th e Privy Council accepted an 
application by the minority bondholders to reject the vote, noting that the 70% 
holder “was bound to exercise it [his vote] with the interests of the class itself kept 
in view as dominant.”92 While the court distinguished North-West because that 
case concerned itself with the rights of shareholders rather than bondholders, the 
court did not indicate clearly why one should be deserving of any higher rights 
than the other. 
Th e majority of the minority principle was also applied in Rights & Issues 
Investment Trust Ltd v Stylo Shoes Ltd.93 In this case, in order to issue shares to 
preserve control while eff ecting an acquisition, the defendant company proposed 
to divide the existing shares into ordinary shares and management shares (the 
latter would gain substantial additional voting rights). Th e fact that the holders 
87. Ibid at 493.
88. [1900] 1 Ch 656, 16 TLR 213 (CA) [Allen].
89. Ibid at 671.
90. [1887] 12 App Cas 589, 3 TLR 789 (PC) [North-West].
91. [1927] AC 369, 43 TLR 195 (PC).
92. Ibid at 378.
93. [1965] 1 Ch 250, [1964] 3 WLR 1077. 
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of the management shares refrained from voting their shares on the proposed 
recapitalization and that approximately 90% of the disinterested shareholders 
voted in favour of the transaction were key to the court’s determination that 
the transaction was not oppressive of the minority. Applying the Allen principle, 
Justice Pennycuick held that, since only disinterested shareholders had voted, the 
test of voting in good faith and in the interests of the company as a whole had 
been satisfi ed.94
For reasons discussed below (describing what we call the “displacement 
eff ect”), neither this UK decision nor the US case law was considered relevant in 
the Magna fairness hearing. Even more telling is the fact that many of the academic 
critiques of the Magna transaction have focused on why the Commission should 
have invoked its “public interest” jurisdiction to enjoin the transaction (by 
issuing a cease-trade order or mandating a coat-tail provision), notwithstanding 
the overwhelming degree of minority shareholder support for the transaction.95 
One author goes so far as to argue that the exercise of the Commission’s “public 
interest” jurisdiction in this manner should have been based on the “likely 
reasonable expectations” of the Class A shareholders—confl ating the corporate 
law oppression remedy test with the Commission’s “public interest” jurisdiction.96
IV. THE FLEETING INTERSECTION OF CANADIAN 
CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAW
Although the common law certainly had the potential to develop doctrines 
similar to those found in US corporate law, the Canadian regulatory regime 
evolved in a diff erent direction. A key factor infl uencing this trajectory was the 
concomitant development of securities regulation. 
Historically, Canadian securities legislation was designed to protect investors 
in their dealings with brokers and promoters.97 However, by 1965 the Attorney 
General’s Committee on Securities Legislation in Ontario recommended that 
94. Ibid at 256.
95. See e.g. Jeff  MacIntosh, “Some Refl ections on Magna and Dual Class Share Structures,” 
(2011) [unpublished], online: <http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/userfi les/cmi/fi le/Some%20
Refl ections%20on%20Magna%20and%20Dual%20Class%20Share%20Structures%20
June%2017%202011.pdf>; Anita Anand, “Was Magna in the Public Interest?” (2011) 49:2 
Osgoode Hall LJ 311. 
96. Ibid at 331.
97. See Philip Anisman, “Th e Commission as Protector of Minority Shareholders” in Special 
Lectures of the Law Society of Upper Canada: Securities Law in the Modern Financial 
Marketplace (Toronto: De Boo, 1989) 451 at 452.
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the Ontario Securities Act98 be amended to refl ect the recognition that public 
confi dence in the integrity of capital markets also depends on investors’ ability 
to make informed decisions and exercise their franchise.99 Th e following year 
Ontario enacted a new Securities Act, the fi rst Canadian legislation to require 
continuous disclosure by issuers and to regulate the proxy process, takeovers, and 
insider trading.100 Th e province made an eff ort to integrate these provisions with 
Ontario corporate law by enacting parallel provisions in the corporate statute.101 
As late as 1971, the Ontario Court of Appeal diff erentiated between identical 
provisions in corporate and securities legislation by noting that the purpose of 
the former was evaluating the conduct of management while the Securities Act 
provision was limited to the exemptions relating to trading in securities.102
While the distinction between corporate and securities law in the United 
States refl ects the division of legislative jurisdiction between the federal government 
and the states, no such constitutional limitation arises in Canada, where the 
provinces have jurisdiction over both corporate and securities law.103 Shortly after 
the new Securities Act was enacted, the Chair of the Ontario Securities Commission 
argued that:
Th e distinction between corporate and securities law is a largely artifi cial one that 
was developed in the United States to meet distinctive constitutional problems in 
that country. Investors would, I believe, be better served in Canada if the two regulatory 
activities were combined.104
Th is was not to be the case. Over time, Canadian securities regulators 
became increasingly active in their interventions in corporate transactions. As 
they gradually expanded the exercise of their powers to constrain the conduct of 
controlling shareholders, the role of corporate law and company law administrators 
simultaneously decreased.105 Likewise, there was less demand for corporate law 
98. Supra note 1.
99. Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on Securities Legislation in Ontario (Toronto: 
Queen’s Printer, 1965) [Kimber Report].
100. Th e Securities Act, 1966, SO 1966, c 142.
101. See An Act to amend the Corporations Act, 1966, SO 1966, c 28.
102. Re Niagara Wire Weaving Co Ltd, [1971] 3 OR 633, 21 DLR (3d) 305 (CA).
103. Reference re Securities Act (Canada), 2011 SCC 66, 339 DLR (4th) 577 [Reference re 
Securities Act]; Ramandeep K Grewal & Edward J Waitzer, “National Securities Regulation: 
Centralization and its Discontents” (2012) 27:3 BFLR 529.
104. James C Baillie, “Shareholders Remedies” in Special Lectures of the Law Society of Upper 
Canada: New Developments in the Law of Remedies (Toronto: De Boo, 1981) 21.
105. In 2001 the takeover bid and most of the insider trading and going-private provisions 
in the CBCA were repealed. Th e last Policy Statement issued by the Director under the 
CBCA was issued on 4 January 2010 and clarifi ed a Policy Statement issued by a previous 
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expertise and activism by Canadian courts. Th is stands in sharp contrast to the 
United States.
V. CANADIAN SECURITIES REGULATION TO THE FORE—
THE DISPLACEMENT EFFECT 
Canadian corporate statutes have embraced, to a limited extent, the notion of 
imposing constraints on shareholders through various forms of majority-of-the-
minority approval. Th e primary manifestation is through the requirement for 
class voting with respect to fundamental changes where a class of shareholders is 
aff ected in a manner diff erent than other classes, irrespective of whether the class 
ordinarily votes.106 However, with limited exceptions, Canadian corporate law does 
not impose majority-of-minority requirements within a class of shareholders.107
Perhaps more importantly, Canadian corporate statutes provide that 
shareholder ratifi cation does not relieve directors and offi  cers from their duty 
to act in accordance with the applicable statute.108 Th is reverses the common 
law embodied in Foss v Harbottle.109 It is clear that the drafters of the Dickerson 
Report, which served as the foundation of the federal corporate statute, felt that 
this reversal would serve as a restraint on the conduct of controlling shareholders: 
“Rather than set out a specifi c rule declaring how an act of the directors may be 
ratifi ed, we think it better to characterize shareholder ratifi cation or waiver as an 
evidentiary issue, which in eff ect compels the court to go behind the constitutional 
structure of the corporation and examine the real issues.”110
Director, which had suggested that the arrangement provisions of the Act might be construed 
narrowly. Th e immediately preceding Policy Statement (regarding oppression remedy 
guidelines) was issued 8 June 2005. Canada, Industry Canada, Notice from the Director, 
Amendments to the CBCA Policy Concerning Arrangements, (Ottawa: Corporations Canada, 
2010); Canada, Industry Canada, Oppression Remedy Guidelines, Policy Statement 11.30, 
(Ottawa: Corporations Canada, 2005).
106. See e.g. CBCA, supra note 83, ss 176, 183(4), 189(7); Business Corporations Act, RSO 1990, c 
B.16, ss 170, 176(3), 185(2) [OBCA].
107. One exception is a majority of minority requirement in connection with going-private 
transactions under section 189 of the OBCA, ibid. Another variation on minority approval 
is the requirement for an acquiror to achieve a 90% tender into a takeover bid of the target 
shares “other than shares held at the date of the take-over bid by or on behalf of the off eror” 
in order to be able to squeeze-out the remaining shareholders (without resorting to a second 
step amalgamation transaction): CBCA, supra note 83, s 206(2); OBCA, ibid, s 188(1).
108. See CBCA, supra note 83, s 122(3); OBCA, ibid, s 134(3).
109. (1843), 67 ER 189, 2 Hare 461 (Ch).
110. Proposals for a New Business Corporations Law for Canada, vol 1 (Ottawa: Information 
Canada, 1971) at para 487 [Dickerson Report].
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In spite of such admonition, one is hard-pressed to fi nd cases involving 
public companies in which Canadian courts have been prepared to develop the 
common law regarding the conduct of shareholders or to look beyond 
shareholder ratifi cation and review the substantive fairness of a transaction. In 
Maple Leaf Foods, the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s decision 
not to apply the “enhanced scrutiny standard” or “proper purpose test” (which 
shifts the burden of proof to the directors to show that their acts were consistent 
only with the best interests of the corporation).111 Th e enhanced scrutiny standard 
was also rejected by Justice Blair in CW Shareholdings Inc v WIC Western 
International Communications Ltd.112 Instead, the majority-of-the-minority 
principle and other constraints on controlling shareholders, including a willingness 
to review the fairness of a transaction, were taken up by securities regulators and 
stock exchanges, initially on an ad hoc and reactive basis.113 
In Re Cablecasting Ltd,114 the Commission declined to issue a cease-trade 
order to block a freeze-out transaction. However, it noted that it might do so 
even where a transaction did not violate the Securities Act if the transaction, 
“while consistent with the language of prior policy rulings and statements of the 
Commission, would contravene the intent of these rulings and statements and 
detract from the credibility of the capital markets or be otherwise inconsistent 
with the best interests of investors.”115 Th e Commission noted the procedural 
advantages of court adjudication, which carries with it a “level of refi nement 
of fact-fi nding that is attained by the exchange of pleadings, the examinations 
for discovery, the formal trials and the adversary relationship that characterize 
judicial proceedings.”116 Accordingly, the Commission stated that it would only 
exercise its “public interest” power in cases involving fraud or a “fl agrant abuse in 
some other respect” and “only if no lesser remedy suffi  ces.”117
111. Pente Investment Management Ltd v Schneider Corp (1998), 40 BLR 244, 62 OTC 1 (Gen 
Div). As was noted by the Court of Appeal in Maple Leaf Foods, earlier judicial decisions had 
adopted a proper purpose test as a way of addressing the potential confl ict of interest between 
directors and certain groups of shareholders. Supra note 82 at para 35.
112. CW Shareholdings v WIC Western International Communications Ltd (1998), 30 OR (3d) 755, 
160 DLR (4th) 131. 
113. As early as 1966, the Ontario Securities Commission made the proposed sale of an escrowed 
control block of securities conditional upon the approval of disinterested shareholders. In 
the Matter of the Securities Act and In the Matter of Consolidated Manitoba Mines Limited and 
Great Basin Metal Mines Limited, [1966] OSC Bull 5. 
114. Re Cablecasting Ltd, [1978] OSC Bull 37 [Cablecasting]. 
115. Ibid at 41.
116. Ibid at 42.
117. Ibid at 42. Section 127 of the Act gives the Commission broad powers where “in its opinion 
it is in the public interest to make the order or orders.” Th e Court has held that this power 
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In Re Lindzon, the Commission declined to issue a cease-trade order sought 
by Commission Staff  in respect of a related-party transaction.118 Although the 
Commission found that the transaction could be regarded as oppressive and 
improvident, it again exercised adjudicatory restraint, determining that “[e]xcept 
in special circumstances the Commission’s authority should not be extended to 
exercising a jurisdiction analogous to that of the civil courts in matters that do 
not arise under the Act.”119 Th e Commission acknowledged that one reason for 
this “self-imposed restraint” was that a determination by it of a breach of 
directors’ duties “would raise diffi  cult issues of fact and law between private 
litigants which the procedures of the Commission are not suited to resolve.”120
Such restraint was soon overtaken by a series of Commission responses to 
particular transactions. Th e starting point was OSC Policy 3-37 (issued in September 
1977 in respect of “issuer bids” but amended the following year shortly after 
the Cablecasting decision), which required majority-of-minority approval and an 
independent valuation of the aff ected securities in going-private transactions.121 
Ultimately, Policy 3-37 became Policy 9.1 and then Multilateral Instrument 61-
101, which sets out a detailed host of procedural requirements that apply to 
issuer bids, insider bids, business combinations, and related-party transactions, 
including valuation requirements and minority approval requirements.122
Th e real infl ection point, however, was in Re Canadian Tire Corp, which 
dealt with a proposed transaction in which the “independent dealers” of Canadian 
Tire (a retail chain) sought to acquire control of the company from the Billes 
family members at a substantial premium. Th e independent dealers made a bid 
for only 49% of the common (voting) shares, thereby circumventing the coat-tail 
provision that was geared to a bid for a majority of the common shares.123 Th e 
Commission, while reaffi  rming the principles it had expressed in Cablecasting 
and acknowledging that the proposed transaction did not violate any provisions 
should not be used merely to remedy misconduct alleged to have caused harm or damage 
to private parties. See Committee for the Equal Treatment of Asbestos Minority Shareholders v 
Ontario (Securities Commission), 2001 SCC 37, [2001] 2 SCR 132 [Asbestos].
118. In the Matter of the Securities Act, 1978 and in the Matter of Irving S Lindzon, and 370815 
Ontario Limited (1982), 4 OSC Bull 43C. 
119. Ibid at 59C.
120. Ibid at 59C-60C.
121. “Going Private” Transactions, Including Comments as to other Issuer Bids and Insider Bids, OSC 
Notice, [1978] OSCB 214 (July 1978).
122. Multilateral Instrument 61-101, supra note 37.
123. (1987), 10 OSC Bull 857, 35 BLR 56, 1987 CarswellOnt 128 (OSC) (WL Can), aff ’d 
(1987), 59 OR (2d) 79, 35 BLR 117 (Ct J (Gen Div)) [Canadian Tire]. Leave to appeal to 
the Ontario Court of Appeal was refused on 16 April 1987.
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of the Securities Act or other regulatory requirements, took the view that the 
bid was “as grossly abusive a transaction as the Commission has had before it in 
recent years,” and that if “allowed to proceed, confi dence in our capital markets 
will inevitably suff er and individuals will be less willing to place funds in the 
equity markets.”124 Accordingly, the Commission noted that “[t]here is bound 
to be overlap [between the courts and the Commission] as there is no clear 
line between securities and corporate matters”125 and was prepared to exercise 
its public interest power under Section 123 (now Section 127) of the Securities 
Act—notwithstanding the absence of a demonstrated breach. Moreover, while 
stating that “[o]ur decision to impose a cease trading order does not depend on a 
fi nding of breach of fi duciary duty,”126 the Commission stated that:
[A]n allegation of breach of fi duciary duty, and evidence which clearly concerns the 
conduct of those who are fi duciaries, can be important in supporting facts which 
otherwise would support a section 123 order. Th at is the case here. Th e Billeses are 
in a fi duciary position in at least two categories—as directors of [Canadian] Tire 
and as [Canadian] Tire’s controlling shareholders. While the law in Canada is still 
developing with respect to the fi duciary duty that controlling shareholders owe to 
the minority, the Courts in Ontario have clearly signalled that a duty of fairness to 
the minority is imposed upon those who are in a controlling shareholder position.127 
Th e Commission’s decision in Canadian Tire was controversial. Many 
commentators argued that the use of its “public interest” power, in the absence 
of a breach of some specifi c provision in the Act, conferred upon the Commission 
unduly broad discretion without appropriate standards.128 Justice Reid 
summarized the concern as follows:
Appellants contend that the discretion that section [123] confers on the Commission 
was not intended to be exercised in the absence of a concurrent breach of the Act, 
or regulations made under the Act, or of policies declared by the Commission in 
the form of policy statements. … To interpret the section diff erently would, in 
appellants’ submission, confer an unprecedented, unjustifi ed, unintended and 
unreviewable discretion on the Commission. It would place the Commission “above 
the law”. Simply by labelling something as being contrary to the public interest, the 
124. Ibid at 945.
125. Ibid at 953.
126. Ibid at 954.
127. Ibid [emphasis added].
128. See e.g. Hudson N Janisch, “Reregulating the Regulator: Administrative Structure of 
Securities Commissions and Ministerial Responsibility” in Special Lectures of the Law Society 
of Upper Canada: Securities Law in the Modern Financial Marketplace (Toronto: De Boo, 
1989) 97 at 102-03.
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Commission could invoke a jurisdiction beyond eff ective review by any court. Th us 
the Commission, by this bootstrapping device, could create a jurisdiction for itself 
it was never intended to have.129
However, in denying judicial review, Justice Reid invoked a tautological 
response:
Yet to suggest that the discretion conferred by s.123 is “unfettered” in that sense is 
unjustifi ed. Th e fetter consists in the fi nding that something proposed or done is 
contrary to the public interest.130
Th is conclusion was contrary to that expressed by the Royal Commission 
Inquiry into Civil Rights several years earlier, which recommended that, where 
possible, the criteria for Commission action should be more clearly specifi ed than 
simply stating that it may act “where in its opinion such action is in the public 
interest.”131 More recently, the Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in 
Canada recommended that the “public interest” power be used sparingly, 
especially where the behaviour to be sanctioned has not been identifi ed in 
advance as unacceptable.132
Having embarked down the “public interest” path, the Commission wasted 
little time in broadening its ambit. Th e following year, in Re Selkirk Communications 
Limited, the Chair and two Commissioners noted:
Apart from our decision in this case, we wish to note that the test quoted above from 
the reasons in Canadian Tire specifi cally referred to a case where there had not been 
a “demonstrated breach of the Act, the regulations or a policy statement …”. In such 
a case, in the context of a s.123 application, the standard of “clearly demonstrated 
to be abusive” may be appropriate. Th at is not the test that ought to be applied in 
every case in which the “public interest” standard of a particular section of the Act 
is invoked.
Th e concept of the “public interest” is used in a number of sections in the Act and, 
as this case demonstrates, will be used in diff ering contexts by applicants, including 
OSC Staff . No one standard will be applicable in all cases and “unfairness” may 
well be a suffi  cient reason to invoke the concept in a particular case. Each case will 
depend on its own circumstances, including statutory context, particular facts, the 
applicant and burden of proof.133
129. Supra note 41 at 110. 
130. Ibid at 112.
131. Canada, Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights, Report No. 3, vol 5 (Toronto: Queen’s 
Printer, 1971) at 2096.
132. Canada, Final Report of the Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada, 
Canada Steps Up, vol 1 (Toronto: no publisher, 2006) at 110.
133. In the matter of the Securities Act, RSO 1980, Chapter 466, as Amended and In the Matter of Selkirk 
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Th e public interest jurisdiction of the Commission was further developed 
and advanced in subsequent cases featuring contests among shareholders or 
between shareholders and boards of directors. In Re HERO Industries Ltd,134 the 
Commission used its public interest jurisdiction to intervene in a takeover bid 
that, while otherwise in compliance with the Securities Act, thwarted another 
takeover bid, thereby depriving the minority shareholders of the premium 
off ered under that bid. Another example was Re Canadian Jorex Ltd,135 in which 
the Commission used its public interest jurisdiction to cease-trade a shareholder 
rights plan that would otherwise have prevented shareholders from choosing to 
accept one of two unsolicited takeover bids that had been made to the 
shareholders. Th e breadth of the Commission’s public interest jurisdiction, and 
the deference to be shown to its exercise of this jurisdiction, were affi  rmed by the 
Court in its decision in Asbestos, wherein the Court stated: 
In this case … it cannot be contested that the OSC is a specialized tribunal with 
a wide discretion to intervene in the public interest and that the protection of the 
public interest is a matter falling within the core of the OSC’s expertise. Th erefore, 
although there is no privative clause shielding the decisions of the OSC from review 
by the courts, that body’s relative expertise in the regulation of the capital markets, 
the purpose of the Act as a whole and s. 127(1) in particular, and the nature of the 
problem before the OSC, all militate in favour of a high degree of curial deference.136 
In hindsight, it is clear that judicial deference to the expertise of the 
administrative tribunal extended beyond reluctance to interfere with the 
Commission’s determinations in particular hearings. Rather, by its adoption of 
Policy 3-37 and its willingness to utilize its public interest powers, the Commission 
eff ectively “occupied the fi eld” with respect to the imposition of constraints both 
on controlling shareholders, and on the role of boards in the context of transactions 
involving these parties.
Th e exclusive infl uence of the Commission on imposing constraints became 
evident in short order. For example, in 1981 the Ontario Court of Appeal 
rejected the application of a majority-of-the-minority standard in Wotherspoon v 
Communications Limited, Southam Inc, Cablecasting Limited, the Eaton Superassuation Plan, Viking 
Canadian Fund and Viking International Fund (1988), 11 OSC Bull 286 at 305-06.
134. In the Matter of the Securities Act, RSO 1980, Chapter 466, As Amended and In the Matter of 
HERO Industries Ltd, Middlefi eld Capital Fun, Middlefi eld Financial Ltd and New Frontiers 
Development Trust plc and in the Matter of Garth Jestley, Charles Hobbs and Murray Brasseur 
(1990), 13 OSC Bull 3775, 49 BLR 182. 
135. In the Matter of the Securities Act, RSO 1980, Chapter 466, as Amended and in the Matter of 
Canadian Jorex Limited and Mannville Oil & Gas Ltd (1992), 15 OSC Bull 257, 4 BLR (2d) 1. 
136. Supra note 117 at para 49.
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Canadian Pacifi c Ltd.137 Th e Court of Appeal declined to fi nd that the controlling 
shareholder owed any duty to the minority or that a related-party transaction 
must be approved by a majority of the disinterested shareholders, noting that:
Majority rule still applies to shareholders’ meetings, and controlling shareholders 
can still sell assets of the company to their own subsidiaries, provided that full and 
fair disclosure is made to all shareholders of what is being done, and all shareholders 
are treated alike.138
Likewise, both the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench and the High Court 
of Ontario have rejected the majority-of-the-minority approach and held that 
minority shareholders do not constitute a separate “class” for the purposes of 
securing requisite shareholder approvals at corporate law.139 
Courts continue to extend extraordinary deference to the Commission. In 
Re Sears Canada Inc, the Commission found inadequate disclosure, collateral 
benefi ts, and coercive and abusive conduct on the part of a controlling shareholder 
seeking to eff ect a privatization.140 Th e Divisional Court dismissed the application 
for judicial review of the Commission’s decision, noting that “[t]he standard of 
review of reasonableness encompasses ‘the right to be wrong.’”141 It is ironic that, 
whereas a court hearing the case in the fi rst instance would have applied diff erent 
evidentiary standards and likely deferred to the business judgment of the board 
absent evidence of bad faith, it may permit the Commission to do the opposite.142
Th e recent decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal in AbitibiBowater Inc 
v Fibrek Inc is an extreme and apparently anomalous result of this sort.143 In 
contrast to the UK and US cases that impose duties on controlling shareholders, here 
the Quebec securities regulator eff ectively protected the controlling shareholder’s 
rights to the detriment of the minority. If the Ontario Commission paved the 
137. (1982), 35 OR (2d) 449, 129 DLR (3d) 1 (CA), rev’d [1987] 1 SCR 952.
138. Ibid at para 117.
139. See Stevens v Home Oil Co (1980), 123 DLR (3d) 297, 28 AR 331 (QB); General Accident 
Assurance Co of Canada v Lornex Mining Corp (1988), 66 OR (2d) 783, 40 BLR 299 (H Ct J).
140. (2006), 22 BLR (4th) 267, 2006 CarswellOnt 6994 (WL Can) (OSC).
141. Re Sears Canada Inc (2006), 84 OR (3d) 61 at para 13, 21 BLR (4th) 311 (Div Ct), aff ’g 
(2006), 22 BLR (4th) 267, 2006 CarswellOnt 6994 (OSC) (WL Can).
142. See Th e Honourable James M Farley, QC & Andrew Matheson, “Th e Right to Be Wrong: 
Deference to Securities Commissions in M&A Disputes,” (Paper delivered at the Continuing 
Legal Education Society of British Columbia, February 2008), online: <www.cle.bc.ca/
PracticePoints/BUS/03%2004%20Securities.pdf>.
143. Fibrek Inc c AbitibiBowater Inc, 2012 QCCA 569, 2012 CarswellQue 2952 (WL Can) 
[Fibrek]. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was denied on April 19, 2012.
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way for the court’s fairness determination in Magna,144 here the Quebec regulator 
pre-empted fair treatment of the Fibrek minority. 
Th e board of Fibrek, relying on legal and financial advice and the 
recommendation of a committee of independent directors, decided to issue 
redeemable warrants to induce a competing bid at a 40% premium to the initial 
unsolicited bid.145 Th e initial bidder had entered into irrevocable lock-up 
agreements with three of Fibrek’s shareholders who collectively held about 46% 
of Fibrek’s shares. One of those supporting the initial bid was also a large 
shareholder in the parent company of the bidder. Another large shareholder in 
the bidder’s parent company (which acquired most of its Fibrek shares after the 
bid was announced) agreed to support the initial bid, bringing the total 
support for the initial bid to almost 51%.146 Th e warrants would have converted 
to 19.9% of Fibrek’s outstanding shares, thereby eff ectively reducing the percentage 
of shares locked up to the initial bid from 46% to about 37%. Th e warrants were 
clearly crafted to enable an auction process in the face of the lock-up agreements. 
Th ey could not be exercised for 21 days and the holder was required to tender all 
of its shares to a superior proposal accepted by 50.1% of the Fibrek shareholders. 
In such circumstances, the holder would have to surrender to Fibrek either the 
break fee or its profi t on tendering to the superior proposal.147
Th e initial bidder, having previously succeeded in an application to cease-
trade Fibrek’s rights plan, successfully applied to the Quebec securities regulator 
to cease-trade the issuance of the warrants.148 Th e panel, after citing various 
decisions of other Canadian securities regulators which, it suggested, affi  rmed its 
right to intervene “in the public interest,” determined that the issuance of warrants 
in connection with a control contest should only be allowed where there is an 
immediate need for capital, not to neutralize the eff ect of lock-up agreements. It 
also eff ectively determined that the lock-up agreements were rights to be protected, 
notwithstanding that this result would deprive minority shareholders of a 
superior bid.149
144. Anand argues that, in Magna, the court deferred to the Commission’s determination of whether 
the transaction was fair to the minority shareholders. See Anand, supra note 95 at 325.
145. Th e redemption provision was intended to allow for a further competing bid. Th e board also 
agreed to a break fee of about 5%.
146. Fibrek, supra note 143 at para 9.
147. Ibid at para 14.
148. AbitibiBowater inc et RFP Acquisition inc (demanderesses) c Fibrek inc et Mercer Internal inc. 
(intimées) et Autorité des marchés fi nanciers (mise-en-cause), (16 April 2012), Montreal 2012-
024-001 (QC). 
149. Fibrek, supra note 143 at para 24.
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While the trial judge overturned this decision,150 the Quebec Court of 
Appeal restored it unanimously (the Supreme Court later denied leave to appeal). 
It is diffi  cult to reconcile the decision with National Policy 62-202,151 which 
focuses on shareholder primacy in change-of-control transactions, when allowing 
the warrants would have aff orded all shareholders a 40% premium to the initial 
and ultimately successful bid. Yet, as in Re Sears Canada, the Court of Appeal 
was deferential to the determination of the regulatory tribunal and concluded 
that the regulator’s broad and unfettered power to act in the public interest may 
not be interfered with unless the decision was not justifiable, transparent, 
or intelligible.152
VI. CONCLUSION—STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE 
As we have illustrated, the Canadian and American regulatory regimes have 
evolved along quite diff erent tracks, leading to substantively diff erent approaches 
to similar transactions. In the United States the shareholder-centric versus 
director-centric debate has been explicit and dynamic. For the last three decades 
shareholder wealth maximization has prevailed as the goal of corporate governance, 
while securities regulation remained largely director-centric. Responses to 
market crises have led to corporate law reform focused on giving shareholders 
greater power. 
In contrast, there has been relatively little debate in Canada. Rather, the shift 
from a director-centric model to one that is more shareholder-centric has been a 
function of securities regulators occupying the fi eld. Th rough their willingness to use 
their ill-defi ned public interest jurisdiction to intervene in corporate transactions, 
securities commissions have displaced corporate law and its focus on the statutory 
duties of directors. Over time, this displacement has created a self-reinforcing 
cycle in which the courts largely defer to the regulators, who, by the nature of 
their intervention, tend to approach the question of appropriate corporate conduct 
from the perspective of particular complainant’s shareholder interests. Th e result 
150. Fibrek Inc c AbitibiBowater Inc, [2012] RJQ 878, 2012 CarswellQue 2484 (WL Can).
151. Supra note 40. Th e Instrument states that 
[t]he primary objective of the take-over provisions of Canadian securities legislation is the 
protection of the bona fi de interests of the shareholders of the target company. A secondary 
objective is to provide a regulatory framework within which take-over bids may proceed in an 
open and even-handed environment. Th e take-over bid provisions should favour neither the 
off eror nor the management of the target company, and should leave the shareholders of the 
target company free to make a fully informed decision. (Ibid, s 1.1(2).)
152.  Fibrek, supra, note 143 at para 27.
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of this shift has been to leave important questions of responsibility, authority, and 
accountability unanswered or unexplored. 
Th e regulation of public companies is complex and requires balancing the 
diverse interests of multiple groups. Securities regulation has empowered individual 
shareholders, but it has not solved the problem of eff ective collective action by 
those shareholders. It has also not addressed issues relating to shareholders’ formal 
responsibility and accountability for their decision making, either to the minority 
shareholders or to other stakeholders in the company. Securities regulators generally 
lack the evidentiary discipline in their process, as compared to courts, to allow 
for a detailed and meaningful inquiry into director conduct and the question of 
the best interests of the corporation. In addition, given the fragmented nature 
of securities regulation in Canada, there is an inherent tendency towards static 
policy and inconsistent adjudication.153 Notwithstanding these limitations, the 
intervention of securities regulation has, in our view, prevented corporate law 
from developing meaningful mechanisms to oversee the conduct of boards and 
the discharge of their responsibility to manage the business and aff airs of the 
corporation. Canadian corporate law has generally not moved beyond a focus 
on process, leaving to the side the issues of the substantive merits of directors’ 
decisions and the accountability of boards for their decisions. 
Given the increasingly dynamic nature of our capital markets, and their 
close integration with those of the United States, the substantively diff erent 
approaches to regulating corporate conduct and the inability of Canadian courts 
or securities regulators to undertake a more rigorous examination of the role and 
responsibility of the board of directors hinder the eff ective regulation of public 
companies. It is time for a fundamental re-examination of policy orientation. As 
with the three major reviews undertaken in the 1970s—one of the CBCA154 and 
153. Even if securities regulators are to adjudicate directors’ duties, they should do so based on 
express legislative authority and by explicit reference to those duties, rather than by resorting 
to their “public interest” jurisdiction. Th is is the case in Australia, where section 1 of the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) sets out the regulator’s public 
interest objectives and section 1317 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) specifi cally allows 
the regulator to take enforcement action against directors in response to alleged breaches of 
their duties. See Renee M Jones & Michelle Welsh, “Toward a Public Enforcement Model 
for Directors’ Duty of Oversight” (2012) 45:2 Vand J of Transnat’l L 343 (arguing as to 
why some form of external enforcement mechanism beyond private shareholder litigation is 
necessary to ensure optimal conduct from corporate directors). Note that in the Australian 
model, the securities regulator is authorized to sue (in the courts) to enforce directors’ duties, 
rather than to determine them itself.
154. See Dickerson Report, supra note 110.
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the others of securities regulation155—it would be timely to engage the “best and 
brightest” in a broader policy review. Th e Court’s decisions in BCE and the recent 
constitutional reference concerning a proposed Canadian Securities Act156 lend 
additional impetus to such a holistic exercise.
155. See Canada, Department of Consumer and Corporate Aff airs, Proposals for a Securities 
Market Law for Canada (Ottawa: Consumer and Corporate Aff airs Canada, 1979); Kimber 
Report, supra note 99.
156. In this case, the Court addressed the desirability of cooperative federalism, animated by 
“respect that each level of government has for each other’s own sphere of jurisdiction.” 
Reference re Securities Act, supra note 103 at para 133. Th e same logic applies in this instance. 
